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This project is about the shape of our moral understanding and discourse. Herein, I 
describe the moral discourse and understanding afforded through narrative. I understand 
narrative as both a medium of discourse (i.e. storytelling) and a mode of understanding 
(i.e. a way to understand oneself, others, and the world(s) in which we find ourselves). In 
order to describe the ethical understanding and discourse constructed through narrative, I 
use the meta-ethical framework of Aristotelian virtue theory. The language of virtue 
theory constitutes the framework upon which I construct my argument regarding the 
irreplaceable and efficacious nature of narrative. The preface tells the story of this 
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 I presented this project at the Honors Student Symposium in late March, 2019. I 
opened my presentation stating that this project is a work in progress. It remains a work 
in progress. I have not yet written a version of this essay which precisely states the 
intuition from which I have drawn inspiration throughout this project. I have written 
multiple versions attempting to describe what I now understand to be the central issue 
from multiple angles. There is one version which I consider complete. This version is my 
submission for the final undergraduate honors thesis. 
 As stated, I have not been able to construct a discourse which entirely captures the 
intuition at the heart of this project. Since unresolved tension between ideas is interesting, 
I have decided to include this preface. This preface explains why I am not satisfied with 
the complete version which I am submitting as my undergraduate honors thesis. This 
preface, by telling the story of this project and contextualizing the current final version of 
this essay, serves to highlight and make clear the set of issues at the heart of this project. I 
hope this situates the thesis of the final version within some more nuanced, interesting, 
and difficult overarching discourse. 
 In my Honors Symposium presentation, after stating that this project is a work in 
progress, I explained the content of the project by explaining some discourses and issues 
which I have continuously considered over the past few years. This method – telling the 
story of the development of this project – communicates the true nature of the project 
more effectively than any abstract, propositional lines of reason that I have been able to 
construct. I do feel some vague sense of satisfaction and acceptance that the project, as it 
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currently stands, is described most effectively as a story; for the intuition at the heart of 
the project is an intuition about narrative. More specifically, the intuition at the heart of 
this project is a belief that narrative is an indispensable and irreplaceable component of 
meaningful moral understanding and discourse. This intuition has implications that 
extend beyond the realm of moral discourse, though. Narrative seems to be a method of 
discourse and a mode of understanding that supports understandings of self and other that 
extend beyond questions of morality. The extension of this discourse beyond moral 
epistemology is something I hope to pursue in the future, but this is not an extension I 
have yet made. For now, this project remains close to questions about moral 
understanding. 
 One of my first exposures to academic ethical discourse was in a class on 
Existentialism, taught by Diane Dunham. In this class, I sensed a serious tension that I 
have yet to resolve – the tension, I believe, that lies at the heart of this Honors Thesis 
project. This is the tension between the following: (1) the impossibility of articulating 
some absolutely true ethical or meta-ethical principle and (2) the ostensibly common 
intuition (which I certainly share in feeling) that one must act in a manner which is 
morally justifiable. I realize the impossibility of articulating any perfectly true ethic and I 
realize the impossibility of rationally proving the existence of an absolute ethic, and yet I 
feel I must believe in and behave in accordance with some ethic(s). This tension cannot 
be resolved with some form of moral relativism. I feel intuitively compelled to act 
ethically, and I do not mean that I feel compelled to act in a way that is justifiable within 
a particular society or practice. An ethic, if it is true in any meaningful way, extends 
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beyond the person and the context in which the person exists. This does not, I have come 
to believe, mean that an ethic needs to be simple or reducible to some series of 
prescriptions, rules, or propositions. It does, though, need to present itself forcefully to 
the agent who acts in accordance with it. In the absence of any epistemically forceful 
ethic(s), I sense that life would be defined by confusion and despair. One must feel some 
sense of orientation, and one must feel that the direction of this orientation is not 
arbitrary. 
 As my Honors Thesis adviser, Professor Dunham encouraged me to explore the 
tension that I felt (and still feel), regarding this ethical dilemma. I remember her 
encouraging me to “scratch the itch” that I felt. I found that, as I explored, the itch grew, 
as did the quality of work that I was able to create, as did the areas of study that I felt 
compelled to explore. A significant experience, early in this Honors Thesis project, was 
my exploration of Russian literature, and in particular, Crime and Punishment by Fyodor 
Dostoevsky, suggested to me by Professor Dunham. I spent months carefully reading this 
book, and I was completely enraptured by it. I was entirely convinced by what I would 
call the main claim(s) of this work. I empathized with Raskolnikov, and I felt that his 
moral failures and successes were believable and representative of real moral dilemmas. 
If the book is to be understood as moral literature, it can be understood to make moral 
claims. These claims, though, can not be stated rationally without significantly 
oversimplifying what is contained therein. Crime and Punishment must be experienced to 
be understood, it presents a meaningful ethical perspective, and it is morally correct in 
some seriously meaningful way. The perspective I am describing is at the heart of the 
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conclusion of this Honors Thesis project. It is not that the thesis is about Crime and 
Punishment, it is rather about the fact that these claims about Crime and Punishment are 
coherent and possible in the first place. It is an attempt to articulate why and how moral 
literature, and storytelling more generally, can provide orientation and seriously 
substantive moral discourse and development. Crime and Punishment inspired me to 
reflect upon the moral reality in which I find myself in a more serious and productive 
way than is typical when I read rational meta-ethical discourses. Similarly, it made me 
realize the epistemic force of a series of non-propositional yet substantive ethical claims. 
This book disclosed to me things about the ethical reality in which I find myself. 
 My attempts to articulate this intuition – of the resolution of the ethical tension I 
felt through a turn towards storytelling – have taken various forms, as I mentioned prior. 
Dr Michael Cox, in the class Philosophy of Religion after I expressed an interest in the 
capabilities of narrative, pointed me toward the authors Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles 
Taylor. In the works of these authors, I found something like attempts to articulate 
something like the experiences I had with great moral literature. In the case of MacIntyre, 
narrative serves as one of four parts in his modern return to Aristotelian virtue ethics. It is 
reasonable to say that narrative plays a central role in MacIntyre’s account of how we 
ought think about virtue ethics in modernity. In the case of Charles Taylor, and in 
particular his work The Language Animal, there is a turn toward understanding and 
language ‘in the realm of action’ (which is opposed to understanding or language ‘in the 
realm of description’). Taylor, in a seminar given in Australia concerning this book, 
emphasized the fact that to learn the teachings of Socrates, Jesus, or the Buddha, we share 
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stories about these moral exemplars. This is understanding and language ‘in the realm of 
action’, for it is the actions of these exemplars that constitute our discourse and 
understanding about their teachings. Taylor asserts that there is an ‘antiphonal relation’ 
between these realms (i.e. the realm of action and realm description) – that we move back 
and forth between them. I assert with reasonable confidence that to move into the realm 
of description and try to explain these teachings using abstract principles is to necessarily 
lose something of their epistemic meaning and force. This is why I can not quite explain 
the impact and importance of Crime and Punishment – what the book discloses can not 
be reduced and explained. The teaching is tied up with the story itself. 
 Following the discourses charted out, for the most part, by MacIntyre, I became 
interested in virtue ethics. I enrolled in classes with Dr Myrna Gabbe and Dr John Inglis. 
Therein, I was allowed to explore the virtue ethics of Aristotle and Aquinas. These 
professors helped me establish an understanding of the foundations of the tradition of 
virtue in western philosophy. The linguistic and conceptual frameworks provided in these 
classes ended up constituting the meta-ethical framework of the final version of this 
essay. I worked closely with Dr Gabbe to construct a coherent meta-ethical framework in 
this version of the essay. The final version of this essay is this project at the intersection 
of virtue theory and my intuitions about narrative. I was able to find concepts through 
which to describe my intuitions about narrative in the language of virtue ethics. The 
problem I have with this final version is that the intuition did not arise from the 
conceptual framework of virtue theory, as the essay seems to suggest. Virtue theory 
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provides a useful framework through which to discuss the intuition, but it is not a 
necessary component of the final position. 
 My intention in writing this preface is to introduce nuance and context that would 
otherwise not exist when reading the final version of this honors thesis. The essay can be 
read as a standalone defense of the coherence of virtue theory and the importance of 
narrative in our conceptualization and teaching of virtue. Still, the unresolved tension and 
the yet-to-be-articulated intuition described in this preface are live issues. The final 
version of this essay skates past these unresolved issues and exists in a more 
propositional, coherent, and defensible space. I hope this preface, in situating the final 






Introduction and Summary of Claims 
 In this essay, I use Aristotelian virtue theory to describe capabilities made 
available through narrative. I aim to describe the moral understanding and discourse 
afforded by narrative, and I assert that virtue theory supplies a framework through which 
to accomplish this task. I first develop a coherent meta-ethical account of Aristotelian 
virtue theory, then I apply the notions which constitute virtue theory to describe the moral 
understanding and discourse made possible through narrative. 
 I defend the following claims: (I) a coherent account of virtue theory requires 
commitments to unified, essence-having conceptions of persons and teleological 
conceptions of persons; (II) narrative allows conceptualization of persons as unified 
moral agents directed towards a telos, thereby allowing us to understand ourselves and 
others as agents within the framework of virtue theory; and (III) storytelling is a medium 
of discourse that allows us to disclose and defend substantive accounts of virtue (i.e. of 
what is virtuous and the telos towards which that virtue directs). Each of these claims is 
defended in the section of the essay which corresponds with the claim number. 
 In Part I, I discuss Aristotle's virtue theory and how it is informed by his 
philosophy of human nature, thereby establishing a coherent meta-ethical account of his 
virtue theory. I focus on Aristotle's methods and abstract commitments. I do not aim to 
defend his ethics, but rather to defend and use his meta-ethical framework. I place 
particular emphases upon the role of habit as well as the role of telos. This account of 
Aristotelian virtue theory ultimately plays a critical role in my assertions regarding 
narrative. Virtue theory provides the language and conceptual framework through which I 
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describe and make sense of the ethical understandings and discourses afforded by 
narrative. 
 In Part I, after defending the coherence of virtue theory, I consider the difficulties 
of understanding virtue. The virtues (i.e. what is and is not virtuous) do not and cannot 
reduce to fully comprehensible, rational principles or prescriptions. Acting virtuously is 
not a matter of learning ethical prescriptions and principles, virtue is expressed 
spontaneously by persons with developed virtuous disposition and habits. Accordingly, 
one cannot comprehend, discuss, or disclose a substantive understanding of virtue and the 
telos towards which virtue directs by establishing first principles and constructing logical, 
atemporal, or reductive arguments. To understand or discuss ourselves as moral agents 
within the framework of virtue theory, we must consider ourselves as unified, essence-
having beings, moving towards an irreducible telos through the development of habits 
and disposition. As discussed in Parts II and III, narrative allows us, even in our 
contemporary milieu, to conceptualize, analyze, and discuss ourselves as such. 
 In Part II, I consider narrative as a mode of thought (i.e. thinking of oneself and 
others as one thinks of characters creating stories). As a mode of thought, narrative 
affords consideration of ourselves and others as unified moral agents directed towards a 
resolution (telos) that corresponds with our habits and disposition. To defend this 
assertion, I find compatible claims regarding the capabilities of narrative in The 
Language Animal by Charles Taylor and After Virtue by Alasdair MacIntyre. These two 
works have dissimilar foundations and intentions but arrive at similar assertions 
regarding the capabilities made available through narrative. Referencing arguments from 
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both Taylor and MacIntyre, I assert that narrative allows us to unify the rich 
heterogeneity of a human life and its purposes, thereby supplying the means to 
understand ourselves and others teleologically and as unified moral agents aiming 
towards overarching goals or purposes. Narrative allows us to consider ourselves and 
others as moral agents within the framework of virtue theory. 
 In Part III, I move beyond my discussion of Taylor and MacIntyre and make my 
own assertions about how one can effectively understand narrative as a medium of 
discourse. I assert that storytelling allows us to present, disclose, and defend coherent 
conceptions of virtue more effectively than supposedly objective, propositional, or logical 
discourse. I describe morally-concerned stories as arguments which present and defend 
unified accounts of virtue (i.e. of what is virtuous), including the telos towards which 
virtue directs. Characters are defined by their disposition and habits and they move 
towards an end or resolution which corresponds with their disposition and habits. The 
telos is represented by the resolution of the story. A coherent, well-told story can present 
and defend a unified and profoundly substantive conception of virtue and the 
corresponding end towards which that virtue directs. Thus, I understand the disclosures of 
coherent, well-told, and morally-concerned stories as disclosures of virtue. 
Part I – Aristotelian Conceptions of Human Nature and Virtue 
 Before applying the meta-ethical framework of virtue theory to describe the 
capabilities of narrative, a coherent account of Aristotelian virtue theory must be 
established. Herein, I focus upon two fundamentals of Aristotle's virtue theory. The first 
is the role of habit in virtue. The second is the role of telos. In Part I, I introduce these 
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two fundamentals as components of virtue theory, then I describe how they are informed 
by and cohere with Aristotle's broader commitments and worldview. This approach 
allows consideration of the broad commitments and beliefs which are necessary for a 
coherent belief in virtue theory. To conclude Part I, I describe how these fundamentals of 
virtue theory establish the space in which to describe and defend the capabilities of 
narrative. 
 Becoming virtuous, for Aristotle, is developing virtuous habits and disposition 
through repeated acts.1 Acting virtuously depends upon development of virtuous habit 
and disposition.2 Those who have developed such habits and disposition have impulses, 
intuitions, and desires that are virtuous. Rather than appealing to some set of 
prescriptions or fundamental logical principles, the virtuous person acts virtuously by the 
force of developed habit and disposition. Virtuous action pours forth fluently from the 
person who has worked to develop the right habits and disposition. The importance of 
habit entails that “the virtues we get first by exercising them.”3 Being able to act 
virtuously means having worked towards the ability to do so through the development of 
habits and disposition. This formation begins during childhood and the habits developed 
as a child make “all the difference” in a person's moral development.4 
 In addition to this fundamental role of habit, teleological understanding of beings 
is a foundation of virtue theory. In becoming virtuous, a person becomes actually what 
                                                 
1 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1103a25 
2 Ibid., 1103a15-1103b25 
3 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1103a33 
4 Ibid., 1103b25 
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they were potentially.5 This development is extended over a lifetime and is movement 
towards an end or telos. For example, Aristotle writes of courage as directedness towards 
a noble end. “Each thing is defined by its end. Therefore it is for a noble end that the 
brave man endures and acts as courage directs.” 6 The coherence of Aristotle’s ethical 
framework relies upon a notion of the ends towards which virtue directs. One must have 
some teleological conception of human life for Aristotelian virtue to gain coherence; the 
telos is that which virtue is directed towards, it is the “that for the sake of which”7 virtue 
exists. To understand how and why virtue is understood teleologically and as a product of 
habit, it will be useful to describe teleological causes and human beings' actualization of 
potential more generally. Aristotelian virtue theory builds upon Aristotle's conceptions of 
nature and natural beings. Through consideration of passages in the Physics and their 
relationships to the Nicomachean Ethics, both the role of habit in virtue and the role of 
telos in virtue establish nuance and coherence. 
 In the Physics and elsewhere, Aristotle continuously emphasizes the unified and 
irreducible characteristics of beings. His commitment to a non-reductive mode of 
understanding is seen in discourses on change and becoming. Aristotle considers changes 
such as that of an unmusical person becoming musical. He notes movement between 
opposites (unmusical to musical) and survival of a 'simple' thing (the person who 
undergoes musical development).8 9 Aristotle conceives of persons as enduring, unified 
                                                 
5 Ibid., 1103a26 
6 Ibid., 1115b24 
7 Physics, 194a27 
8 Aristotle, Physics, 190a9 
9 The word 'simple' appears with these same single quote marks in The Basic Works of Aristotle (McKeon) 
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beings that develop towards being in ways that they once were not. Aristotle conceives of 
a being as a whole entity developing from a point at which it lacks a property towards a 
point at which that property has been actualized. He asserts a threefold doctrine: the 
forms toward which beings direct, the corresponding opposites from which beings move, 
and the substratum which persists throughout.10 
 Development of musicality is actualization of potential akin to the development of 
virtuous habits and disposition. Another example of this general framework is Aristotle's 
description of the development of scientific understanding in the Posterior Analytics. 
Ensouled rational creatures develop scientific knowledge through experience but rely 
upon their natural capacity and potentiality in doing so. Experience (repeated sense-
perceptions), combined with the natural capacity of the ensouled being, determines the 
understanding.11 Fundamental similarities exist between Aristotle's conceptions of 
scientific, natural, and ethical growth. Akin to his notion of developing habits which 
actualize the potential virtue of persons, Aristotle's notions of scientific development and 
musical development use concepts of personal development and actualization over time. 
Unified, holistic conceptions of beings (i.e. conceiving of individuals as bundles of 
potentiality which develop and actualize over time) undergird his entire worldview, as 
seen in his discourses on development of scientific knowledge, development of 
musicality, and development of moral virtue. 
 In Physics Book II, Aristotle departs from Antiphon12 in asserting that beings' 
                                                 
10 Ibid., Book 1 Ch. 9 
11 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 99b26-100a8 
12 Aristotle, Physics, 193a13 
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nature subsists not only in their matter, but as dependent upon their being directed 
towards forms.13  Hylomorphism and the form-dependence of beings are fundamental 
commitments that cohere with the conceptions of growth and development discussed in 
the previous paragraphs. He continues to write in terms of wholes (e.g. emphasizing the 
holistic nature of reproduction in stating that “man is born from man”14). This form-
dependent, holistic understanding of beings informs Aristotelian ethics. Aristotle's ethical 
vision is of the whole, essence-having person developing towards what that person has 
been potentially. This vision is constructed of his general conceptions of change and 
becoming: change is actualization and movement towards the developed form which 
exists potentially in natural beings. 
 Aristotle asserts the need to consider the end, the form, the “that for the sake of 
which” towards which things develop.15 Proclaiming a departure from Empedocles and 
Democritus, Aristotle asserts that the end (i.e. the form, the essence) and the matter by 
which beings are made are subjects of the same natural considerations.16 Aristotle 
conceives of nature as directed towards a purposeful end and as unable to be 
conceptualized without consideration of this end. Even further, nature is this impulse and 
movement towards actualized form.17 “It is plain then that nature is a cause, a cause that 
operates for a purpose.”18 Humans contain a principle of development which propels 
them to actualize their potential to fully develop. The developed form is the 'that for the 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 193b1-20 
14 Ibid., 193b8 
15 Ibid., 194a28 
16 Ibid., 194a15-25 
17 Ibid., 192b23 
18 Ibid., 199b33 
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sake of which' or the telos in human terms. 
 Aristotle's general conceptions of nature (more specifically, human nature) inform 
his virtue theory. To develop moral virtue is to actualize the form which had already 
existed potentially. The coherence of this Aristotelian framework relies upon a holistic, 
unified account of beings as well as an account of beings' directedness towards a telos or 
developed form. In the Physics, Posterior Analytics, Nicomachean Ethics and elsewhere, 
we find a language, conceptual structure, and mode of thought which is committed to 
unified conceptions of natural beings and their processes of change. Aristotle shows his 
commitment to these holistic notions in his discourses on science, nature, music, and 
ethics, among others. In this fundamentally holistic epistemology and methodology, we 
find the ability to think and speak meaningfully about character, moral agents, virtue, and 
the intrinsic value of action directed towards a good end, towards the developed form of 
the moral agent. 
 Virtue theory is not immediately coherent and understandable. Aristotle 
repeatedly emphasizes the impossibility of arriving at knowledge of virtue by means of 
precise logic and reasonable discourse. “The whole account of matters of conduct must 
be given in outline and not precisely … Matters concerned with conduct and questions of 
what is good for us have no fixity”19 Aristotle returns often to acknowledge the 
unavailability of precise propositional, prescriptive, or systematic knowledge of virtue. 
Rather, virtue is something that must be developed to be understood. This experiential 
aspect is precisely what makes it such that the virtues we develop as children make “all 
                                                 
19 Ibid. 1104a1 
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the difference.” 20 We rely upon lived, experiential knowledge in order to grasp virtue. 
The audience of these theoretical discourses on virtue, then, consists of those who are 
already far along the path to an actualized virtuous disposition. This suggestion regarding 
the audience of Aristotle’s discourses on virtue is mentioned by Richard Kraut in his 
Stanford Encyclopedia article “Aristotle’s Ethics.”21 
 These acknowledgments reflect the crucial role of habit in the development of 
virtue. Virtuous acts, rather than being products of systematized, propositional, or 
prescriptive discourses, result from developed virtuous disposition. Those who have 
developed virtuous dispositions are those who understand virtue. Further, given that 
virtue is directedness towards a purpose (telos), this same reliance upon virtuous 
disposition and experiential wisdom exists in the pursuit to understand telos-in-human-
terms. Recall that, for Aristotle, to understand is to have some substantial conception of 
the “that for the sake of which,” the teleological cause. Those who have developed 
virtuous habits and disposition are capable of understanding virtue and are thereby 
capable of understanding the telos towards which virtue directs. 
 Given that knowledge of virtue cannot be developed or understood by means of 
propositional, prescriptive, or systematized discourses, the philosopher interested in 
describing virtue faces great difficulty. For one who wishes to present an account of what 
is virtuous, remaining in the “realm of description,” as opposed to the “realm of 
action”,22 presents significant limitations. Attempts to describe virtue with neutral, 
                                                 
20 Ibid. 1103b26 
21 Richard Kraut, “Aristotle's Ethics,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition). 
22 Charles Taylor, “Charles Taylor: ‘The Language Animal’ – Institute for Social Justice,” YouTube Video. 
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propositional, or reductive methods leave much to be desired. Propositional discourse 
cannot disclose a substantive account of virtue and the telos towards which virtue directs.  
 Virtue theory is a meta-ethical structure that is constituted by unified beings 
moving towards their telos. To understand ourselves as the unified moral agents which 
populate virtue theory, we must think of and discuss ourselves as such. The whole entities 
which populate moral truth-claims disappear once one has reduced below the level of 
beings, habits, and actions. Virtue theory is a model of human choice and action 
constituted by unified conceptions of beings. Narrative allows us to consider ourselves in 
a unified and directed manner, akin to how Aristotle envisions us as whole, essence-
having beings moving from undeveloped potential to actualized virtuous disposition, 
towards a corresponding telos. Through narrative, we can substantively understand and 
discuss ourselves as unified moral agents directed towards a telos, without having to 
reduce and rationalize the concepts. 
Part II – Narrative as a Mode of Thought: Understanding Virtue 
 A coherent and actionable account of virtue (i.e. of what is virtuous) requires 
some knowledge of virtuous habits and dispositions as well as knowledge of the 
corresponding telos towards which these habits and dispositions direct. Holding a 
coherent account of what is virtuous requires our being able to consider ourselves and 
others as the agents which populate virtue theory. The irreducible character of these 
notions creates limitations for theoretical, reductive, propositional methods. Over and 
above theoretical and propositional modes of thought, we require a mode of thought that 
allows us to consider ourselves as the agents which populate virtue theory. Narrative is a 
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mode of thought that allows us to consider ourselves as unified moral agents directed 
towards a telos that corresponds with our habits and disposition. To defend this claim, I 
turn towards two recent and influential works: After Virtue by Alasdair MacIntyre and 
The Language Animal by Charles Taylor. 
 Alasdair MacIntyre claims that modern moral discourse is interminable and shrill 
because the conceptual framework that once allowed moral claims to be rationally 
defensible no longer exists.23 He asserts that this lost coherence was originally afforded 
by Aristotle's teleological framework and the “fundamental contrast between man-as-he-
happens-to-be and man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential-nature.”24 In 
MacIntyre's argument, the guidance afforded by belief in human telos was lost after the 
Enlightenment. Consequently, post-Enlightenment ethical theories were doomed to fail. 
 After diagnosing the ethical failures of the Enlightenment, After Virtue makes 
positive assertions regarding a resurrection of virtue theory and renewed rational moral 
justification. A foundation of these positive assertions is MacIntyre's emphasis on 
understanding rooted in narrative. MacIntyre asserts that the contexts supplied by 
narratives allow individual actions to have meaning and allow us to make value-
judgments about said actions.25 Narrative is the form through which we understand the 
lives and actions of ourselves and others.26 A human being is, for MacIntyre, “essentially 
a story-telling animal.”27 Narrative, as a framework through which MacIntyre describes 
                                                 
23 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, University of Notre Dame Press, 6 
24 Ibid., 52 
25 Ibid., 210 
26 Ibid., 212 
27 Ibid., 216 
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actions and purposes, establishes coherent and unified accounts of persons moving 
through time, directed towards a “climax or telos.”28  These assertions inform the 
assertions of this essay. Narrative allows us to understand our enacting of the Aristotelian 
telos, effectively allowing moral discourse and understanding to establish and maintain 
coherence. 
 MacIntyre is not alone in emphasizing the orienting and ineradicable roles of 
narrative. In The Language Animal, Charles Taylor is concerned with how we come to 
understand ourselves, our goals, and our social interactions, among many other things. 
Taylor asserts that language does not merely allow us to describe life, purposes, and 
meaning and work towards preexisting goals, but that language's expressive and 
constitutive character allows us to reveal new purposes and goals. Our ability to describe 
and reveal new purposes and goals is intimately connected with narrative, which is 
discussed by Taylor in Chapter 8 (“How Narrative Makes Meaning”).29 
 Taylor describes the “antiphonal relation between attempts to understand in two 
media – the medium of action and the medium of description.”30 He asserts that we 
cannot discuss and learn ethical dispositions merely through descriptive statements about 
the contents of an ethical structure. The actions and stories of teachers such as Socrates, 
Jesus, or the Buddha allow their teachings to become substantive and compelling. 
Learning these teacher's ethical dispositions is a continuous and developmental process 
that requires engagement with the motivations and experiences – the stories – of the 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 217 
29 Charles Taylor, The Language Animal, Belknap Press, 291. 
30 Charles Taylor, “Charles Taylor: ‘The Language Animal’ – Institute for Social Justice,” YouTube Video. 
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teacher.31 These assertions also (i.e. in addition to MacIntyre's assertions) inform the 
meta-ethical assertions of this essay, for they assert that narrative allows us to coherently 
consider ourselves and others as unified moral agents directed towards overarching aims 
or purposes. Further, Taylor's approach towards understanding the capabilities of 
narrative as an endeavor in the philosophy of language informs this essay's emphasis on 
the effective conceptual frameworks afforded by virtue theory. As previously stated, the 
overarching claim of this paper is that the language and concepts of virtue theory can be 
applied to capably understand the ethical understandings and disclosures afforded 
through narrative and storytelling. 
 For both MacIntyre and Taylor, moral understandings and orientations rely upon 
narrative. These authors' descriptions of what is afforded through narrative are similar in 
some fundamental ways. MacIntyre asks and answers the following: “In what does the 
unity of an individual life consist? The answer is that its unity is the unity of a narrative 
embodied in a single life.”32 Narrative holds together our conceptions of ourselves as 
unified beings directed towards the completion of an overarching project. And coming to 
similar conclusions from a different context, Taylor asserts that human meanings and 
goals learned through stories cannot be separated from whole stories. Understanding the 
outlook of an agent requires that one understands the experiences that led this particular 
agent to this outlook.33 For both MacIntyre and Taylor, there is a wholeness (MacIntyre 
uses the term 'unity', Taylor uses the term 'gestalt') afforded by the story of an event or a 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, University of Notre Dame Press, 218. 




 Taylor reasons that it is the unity, or gestalt, afforded by narrative that links this 
discussion with ethics. An ethical judgment is, after all, a unification of diverse factors. 
Taylor imagines a man who, after drinking alcohol, crashes his car while driving through 
fog on an icy road. Taylor observes that atemporal generalizations such as “fog reduces 
visibility” and “ice makes roads slippery” factor into our judgment of the crash, but that 
our “all-in judgment” is more akin to a judge in the judicial process than a scientist 
analyzing causal factors.34  Various factors can be considered separately, but the sense 
afforded by the whole narrative allows a final, all-in judgment to be made. This final, all-
in judgment also takes into account our rich sense of what motivates individuals and their 
actions. As Taylor puts it, “a story, whether fictional or historical, will also involve 
human motivations, actions, interactions, differences of character ... in short, the 
vicissitudes of fortune, mutual symphony, antipathy, and a whole gamut of attitudes to 
others.”35 A coherent story (partially but effectively) captures a unified account of an 
unimaginably complex set of factors, many of which are profoundly familiar and intimate 
for us story-telling, language-using, animals. The all-in nature of ethical judgments 
requires our being able to capture a unified account of diverse factors and experiences. 
Narrative affords this unity and enables our arrival at coherent, substantive ethical 
judgments. 
 The manner in which we understand lives, actions, and purposes (of ourselves and 
                                                 
34 Ibid., 291. 
35 Ibid., 295 
21 
 
others) is, for both Taylor and MacIntyre, intimately connected with narrative. MacIntyre 
suggests that we can understand a person suffering a sense of meaninglessness as having 
lost an intelligible notion of the narrative of his or her life.36 The narrative of a life orients 
and gives meaning to individual actions. Taylor suggests that we cannot have a 
meaningful understanding of self or life “which doesn't include some such diachronic 
reading of the whole through an extended gestalt.”37 For both Taylor and MacIntyre, 
narrative provides us with the means to make sense of and to endure life.38 Narrative is a 
medium through which to conceptualize the purpose of a life. And with the orientation 
supplied by this sense of purpose, we can judge individual actions. 
 Aristotelian virtue theory presupposes the unity of persons who are extended over 
time and who actualize their potential through long-term processes. Virtue is not a 
product of established principles or prescribed logical maneuvers. Rather, it is an elusive 
and holistic quality of actions and persons that can not be perfectly rationally 
circumscribed or comprehended. There are serious limitations necessarily placed upon 
the philosopher attempting to comprehend virtue theoretically. This does not mean that 
we can not think about and discuss what is virtuous in a meaningful way, though. 
Narrative allows us to consider ourselves as unified moral agents in the framework of 
virtue theory. And as I will discuss in the following section, storytelling (which is 
narrative as a medium of discourse) provides us with the means to present and defend 
substantive and actionable accounts of what is virtuous. In the following section, I move 
                                                 
36 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, University of Notre Dame Press, 216. 
37 Charles Taylor, The Language Animal, Belknap Press, 295. 
38 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, University of Notre Dame Press, 319. 
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beyond my analysis of MacIntyre and Taylor and I describe how storytelling allows us to 
present, disclose, and defend substantive conceptions of virtue. 
Part III – Narrative as a Medium of Discourse: Disclosing Virtue Through Stories 
 The impossibility of developing virtue as a result of rational discourse has been 
established, as has the impossibility of fully articulating what is virtuous in the form of 
principles or prescriptions. Virtue cannot be understood or developed by means of 
atemporal generalizations, logical reductions, and careful argumentation. Development of 
virtue depends upon development of habit and disposition, and virtuous persons act as 
such for their having worked towards the ability to perform virtuous acts spontaneously, 
by force of habit. Thus, there is no discourse, line of reasoning, or decision-making 
procedure which can allow a person with immoral habits and disposition to immediately 
begin acting virtuously. Rather, the process of developing virtue is an extended one, and 
one that requires belief in the goodness of the ends towards which virtue directs. To 
develop the capacity for virtuous acts, a person must have some conception of the ends 
towards which virtue directs, some “that for the sake of which” from which to draw 
inspiration to develop towards virtuous habits and disposition. Stories can help provide 
such inspiration and can capture rich, complex accounts of virtue and the ends towards 
which virtue directs. Stories allow authors to present claims about what is virtuous while 
remaining in the “realm of action,” taking advantage of the capabilities made available 
through narrative and discussed in the previous section of this essay. 
 A substantive and compelling conception of virtue and the telos towards which 
virtue directs will never be fully captured in any discourse, but it can be more effectively 
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discussed in the form of stories than in the form of logical, propositional discourse. 
Narrative, and thus storytelling, capably depicts unified moral agents, extended across 
time, moving towards ends or resolutions that correspond with their habits and 
dispositions. A story can present a coherent account of persons, their contexts, and their 
often irreducible and inarticulable purposes and goals. The complex and rich nature of 
our moral lives cannot be reduced and boiled down to principles and prescriptions. 
Stories cannot capture a moral perspective in its entirety either, but they can present, 
disclose, and defend moral perspectives and truth-claims more effectively than 
supposedly objective or propositional discourses. In this section, I will attempt to 
construct a useful frame through which to consider storytelling, and I will do so by using 
the concepts and claims of the first two sections. Herein, I understand morally-concerned 
stories as arguments or presentations about virtue which utilize the capabilities of 
narrative discussed in Part II. 
 Witnessing a story is often a revelatory and instructive experience. Stories have 
been used to disclose wisdom within a myriad of cultures and ages. Reading compelling 
moral literature, one feels that one is living the lives of the characters therein. Vivid 
writing allows the reader to feel the emotions and know the thoughts of the characters. 
One pictures oneself as the characters, choosing and living their actions. Authors often 
then reveal the consequences of these characters' dispositions, disclosing the degree of 
virtue and its consequences. Authors such as Dostoevsky and Tolstoy immediately spring 
to mind. Their books are not merely entertainment, they are arguments that exist on the 
level of world-views and moral dispositions. The components of these arguments are the 
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characters (the unified moral agents making choices and developing that populate a 
story), the detailed contexts in which these characters exist and act (which allow the 
claims to establish nuances that generalized abstractions can not establish), and the 
resolutions at which these characters arrive (and which function as the Aristotelian telos 
functions). When readers exist alongside these characters, they realize what is realized by 
these characters. Engaged readers realize or acknowledge the consequences of 
developing the habits and dispositions of the characters. Moral literature is an argument 
for the degree of virtue expressed by particular habits and dispositions. The reader is 
afforded the opportunity to think (in a unified manner, akin to what was discussed in part 
I regarding MacIntyre's notion of 'unity' in narrative39 and Taylor's notion of 'gestalt' in 
narrative40) about the viability of particular habits and dispositions. The author discloses 
knowledge of virtue through vivid, believable, and compelling descriptions of the 
consequences of particular habits and dispositions. These disclosures rely upon 
narrative's ability to unify diverse causal happenings as well as complex contexts, human 
experiences, and purposes. 
 Morally-concerned pieces of literature are arguments that rely upon the unifying 
aspects of the medium to maintain coherence. These arguments cannot be coherently 
disentangled from the medium through which they are disclosed. Taylor writes, “what we 
grasp as an important truth through a story ... is so bound up with how we got there – 
which is what the story relates – that it can't simply be hived off, neglecting the chain of 
                                                 
39 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, University of Notre Dame Press, 218. 
40 Charles Taylor, The Language Animal, Belknap Press, 295. 
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events which brought us there41.” Taylor rightfully asserts that the diachronic process 
which allowed us to arrive at the insight is itself part of the insight, and that the insight 
must remain embedded in the story. The moral perspective gained through a story cannot 
be removed from the story, it cannot be reduced and explained without the coherence 
gained through the whole story. It is not just that stories are entertaining and clever ways 
to present moral claims which might otherwise be stated in clearly-reasoned, 
propositional ethical discourses. The nature of stories is such that they are capable of 
presenting claims that rational discourses cannot present. Stories present ethical truth-
claims in the form of unified moral agents, the contexts in which they act, the habits and 
dispositions which inform their actions, and the resolutions towards which their actions 
direct. In other words, stories present coherent and unified accounts of virtue (i.e. what is 
virtuous) and the ends towards which virtue directs. 
 The characters, dispositions, and lessons disclosed through storytelling do not 
exist but beside each other as part of a coherent and unified whole. If one wishes to 
understand the truth-claims of great literature, reductive and neutral explanations of the 
“moral of the story” will not suffice. Narrative, and thus storytelling, is irreplaceable; it 
cannot be replaced with descriptions of what is gained by the stories themselves. This 
reflects earlier assertions that narrative is an integral and irreplaceable component of our 
self-understanding and our knowledge of orientation and movement towards a resolution 
or telos. Accordingly, the concepts which populate the framework of virtue theory – 
character, growth, development, habit, disposition, purpose, telos – capably describe what 
                                                 
41 Ibid., 300. 
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is gained through the disclosures of storytelling and moral literature. In describing the 
capabilities of storytelling using the language of virtue theory, we arrive at a more 
nuanced and substantial understanding of what is afforded through storytelling. 
 The coherence of a story is of critical importance. If our conceptions of virtue and 
telos are to be inclusive, substantial, and just, the stories we share and exalt must present 
coherent and just accounts of the world and its characters. Franz Kafka wrote that a book 
should be an awakening blow to the head and a hatchet which strikes the frozen seas 
inside us.42 Our ability to judge the coherence of stories relies upon such felt intuitions 
and revelations. Stories re-frame and reshape the content of our ethical beliefs, and they 
often do so by imploring us to realize and articulate what has already been just beyond 
the reach of our awareness. Like a scientific theory affording the means by which to 
conceptualize and describe some physical phenomenon, a story can afford the means by 
which to conceptualize and describe moral phenomena. As should be accounted for in 
any meta-ethical perspective, the possibility for flawed or unjust ethical beliefs still 
exists. In this particular perspective, flawed or unjust ethical beliefs indicates the exalting 
of flawed or incoherent narratives. 
 There is no absolute and timeless text which captures all there is to be said about 
virtue. This much is indicated by the range of compelling and coherent moral literature 
from diverse cultures and ages. Stories from different cultures and time periods and about 
people enacting different social roles make different sorts of claims about virtue. This is 
in keeping with the given account of Aristotelian virtue theory. Virtue, as stated, is not a 
                                                 
42 Franz Kafka, Letters to Friends, Family, and Editors, Schocken Books, 16. 
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product of learning a set of prescriptions or rules to follow. Acquainting oneself with the 
stories of persons – their historical and societal contexts, their actions, purposes, 
disposition, habits, and corresponding resolutions – is not acquainting oneself with rules 
and prescriptions. Rather, if the stories are coherent and well-told, it is the gathering of 
new information about and frameworks through which to consider the complex, rich 
process of developing and enacting virtue.  
 Narrative is both a mode of understanding ourselves and others as well as a 
medium of discussing these understandings. Through storytelling, a medium of discourse, 
we can communicate in what Taylor calls the medium of action and we are able to 
describe our own experiences as we understand and experience them – as a unified 
bundle of complex factors and meanings. A story, if it is told well, discloses the 
consequences of enacting particular habits and dispositions. The resolution of the story - 
the consequences of the characters' actions, habits, and dispositions - discusses and 
educates upon the role of telos. The movement of unified beings (characters) towards 
their ends directly mirrors our own senses of orientation towards telos, our movement 
towards the purposes which allow us to experience life meaningfully. Stories tell of 
persons moving towards their ends, perhaps straying from this path and having to 
overcome some difficulty or otherwise traversing easily with developed, virtuous 
disposition. Stories unify and discuss the degree of virtue expressed by particular habits 
and dispositions more effectively and intimately than atemporal generalization and 
logical reductions. Storytelling is and will remain to be an effective medium for the 





 This essay is a meta-ethical project and is concerned with describing the nature of 
our moral understanding and discourse. The framework of virtue theory affords a litany 
of useful terms and concepts, the application of which affords arrival at capable 
descriptions of moral understanding and discourse. By combining an analysis of virtue 
theory with an analysis of the moral capabilities made available through narrative, I 
arrive at a substantial meta-ethical perspective. The capabilities made available through 
narrative (and thus, through storytelling) can be effectively understood with the 
conceptual framework of virtue theory, and vice versa. Through storytelling, a medium of 
discourse, we become capable of discussing and educating virtue because storytelling 
communicates narrative, a mode of thought that is a fundamental and irreplaceable 
component of our moral understandings. Accordingly, disclosures available in stories can 
be effectively understood as disclosures of virtue. Coherent, well-told, and morally-
concerned stories present and defend substantive accounts of virtue and the telos towards 
which that virtue directs; and stories do this more effectively than supposedly neutral and 
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